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PRINCIPLE OF CBDR-RC: ITS INTERPRETATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH NDCS IN THE
CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Dr. Stellina Jolly* and Abhishek Trivedi**
11 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 309 (2021)
ABSTRACT
For the international community, 2015 was a momentous year in terms
of transformative legal developments. Climate change response culminated
in the adoption of the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), which heralded a new era in the international community’s pursuit
of sustainability. Both of these developments are complementary; the
climate change legal framework acknowledges sustainable development,
and SDGs explicitly recognize the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement
presented to the global community an objective to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change, through sustainable development
and efforts to eradicate poverty and a goal to restrict the global temperature
increase to below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and a
desirable goal of 1.5 degrees Celsius. The failure to achieve this target
would seriously jeopardize States and individuals and challenge the success
of sustainable development and SDGs. The Paris Agreement states not only
that the achievement of the goal is essential, but the agreement must be
implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in
light of different national circumstances. This paper argues that the
adoption of SDGs premised on the idea of leaving no one behind provides
an impetus for the re-evaluation of the principle of CBDR-RC under the
309
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Paris Agreement. The paper explores the possibility of a wider
interpretation of CBDR-RC through the implementation of Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to help the international community
pursue SDGs.
Keywords: CBDR-RC, Equity, NDCs, Sustainable
Development, Sustainable Development Goals.
INTRODUCTION
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a comprehensive set
of universal, human-oriented, integrated, and transformative goals and
targets to achieve, with an overarching idea of sustainable development till
2030.1 The idea of SDGs has been introduced in multiple conferences on
the environment and development initiated by the United Nations. In the
legal sense, the principle of sustainable development embedded in the
concept of equity was enunciated as the leading concept of international
environmental law with the Rio Declaration2 and Agenda 21.3 However,
the core foundation of sustainable development depends on the
reformulation and integration of economic, social, and environmental
systems, and their integration is difficult to measure.4 The adoption of the
Millennium Development Goals saw the international community pursuing
a targeted approach to development.5 In 2012, Rio+20 brought significant
* Dr. Stellina Jolly is a Senior Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Legal Studies, South
Asian University (SAARC) and Visiting Senior Research Associate, Research Centre for
Private International Law in Emerging Countries, University of Johannesburg. She is a
Fulbright scholar with the University of San Francisco and a recipient of the International
Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP). She researches in international environmental law and
conflict of laws, stellinajolly@sau.ac.in.
** Abhishek Trivedi, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University
(SAARC), New Delhi, India, abhishektrivedi2011@gmail.com.
1
See G.A. Res. 70A/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, pmbl. (Sep. 2015) [hereinafter U.N. 2030 Agenda].
2
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug.12, 1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
3
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for
Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Jun.14, 1992).
4
PHILLIPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 215-225 (4th
ed., 2018); Ed Atkins, Deflective Discourse and Sustainable Development, in RETHINKING
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF JUSTICE: ISSUES OF THEORY, LAW, AND
GOVERNANCE 70-87 (B. F. Pérez et al. eds., 2018); CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2009).
5
See G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Millennium Declaration (Sep. 18, 2000).
310
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changes in its approaches to sustainable development with the
strengthening of environmental components. A long negotiation process
resulted in the adoption of targeted sustainable development goals for the
period from 2016 to 2030. The adoption of SDGs, which are aspirational
political goals for States premised on “leaving no one behind,” represents a
significant shift toward capturing the environmental, economic, and social
dimensions of sustainable development and guiding policy decisions
toward achieving objective, transparent and superior development results.6
Climate change, with its disproportionate impact on the poorest, most
vulnerable and marginalized communities (such as people of color, women,
children, elderly and indigenous peoples, etc.), is recognized as one of the
biggest threats to sustainable development and the attainment of SDGs. In
this scenario, it is important to appreciate the complementary nature of
climate change and sustainable development; indeed, States cannot achieve
sustainable development without addressing the disproportionate impacts
of climate change. This is because climate change is fundamentally a social
and political issue that challenges the global economic system founded on
carbon-fueled growth. Climate change nullifies the efforts of nations to
eradicate poverty, reversing decades of progress. It constitutes a threat to
all three dimensions of sustainable development: economic,
environmental, and social. Thus, any failure to address climate change
mitigation seriously undermines the attainment of sustainable
development.7 Considering the idea of “leaving no one behind” anchored in
the SDGs Agenda 20308 and addressing the disproportionate climate
impacts in light of differing capacities of States, it becomes essential to
invoke the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
(CBDR). Against this background, this paper explores the role of CBDR in
the attainment of SDGs. CBDR is a well-founded principle of the climate
change regime and is also applied in the context of sustainable
development. The first part of the paper explains the links between climate
change, sustainable development and SDGs. The second part of the paper
analyzes the links between sustainable development and CBDR and
explores the position of CBDR under the climate change legal framework.
The third part of the paper analyzes the possibility of expansive
6

NORICHIKA KANIE & FRANK BIERMANN, GOVERNANCE THROUGH GOALS: SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 5 (2017).
7
See Shinichiro Fujimori et al., Measuring the Sustainable Development Implications of
Climate Change Mitigation, 15 ENV’T. RES. LETT. 1, 8-9 (2020); U.N. RSCH. INST. FOR
SOC. DEV., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TIMES OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 141-166 (2016),
https://www.unrisd.org/flagship2016-chapter5 (detailing that sustainable development will
not be achievable unless climate change is addressed).
8
U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4, 26, 48, 72, pmbl. at 1.
311
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interpretation and application of CBDR within the Paris Agreement
implementation framework for the attainment of SDGs. The emphasis will
be on the incorporation of CBDR in the implementation of Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs). It is argued that the idea of “leaving no
one behind” and CBDR as stipulated in the Sustainable Development
Agenda creates a valid entry point for reinterpreting CBDR in the context
of implementing NDCs in the Paris Agreement.
I.

RELATION BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Human-induced climate change and the severe consequences it
presents to the poor and vulnerable is a serious threat to sustainable
development.9 Climate change disproportionately affects communities of
low-income households, who are relatively more susceptible to the adverse
impacts of climate change.10 This further exacerbates social inequality in
terms of exposing these communities to the adverse impacts of climate
change and at the same time reducing their ability to adapt to the damage
caused by climate change.11 Sustainable Development Goals can hardly be
achieved without adequately addressing the concerns of marginalized
communities and of the poorest countries. In this regard, prioritizing the
needs of vulnerable communities holds special attention under the climate
change regime’s integrated concept of equity.12 The relationship between
climate change and sustainable development was analyzed and reiterated in
9

Gary W. Yohe et al., Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 803 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing projections of climatechange-related impacts on vulnerable communities).
10
CLAIRE MCGUIGAN ET AL., LSE CONSULTANCY PROJ., POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
ASSESSING IMPACTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE INITIATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 4-14 (2002), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/3449.pdf (examining the disproportionate impact of climate change on
developing nations); EMMANUEL SKOUFIAS ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, THE POVERTY
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2011); Robin Leichenko &
Julie Silva, Climate Change and Poverty: Vulnerability, Impacts, and Alleviation Strategies,
5 WIRES. CLIM. CHANGE 1, 2-8 (2014) (discussing the impact of climate change on poverty
citing evidence from jurisdictions).
11
S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality 2-3 (U.N. DEP’T
OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, Working Paper No. 152 ST/ESA/2017/DWP/152) (offering
conceptual understanding of the relationship between climate change and inequality).
12
See generally Beverly Wright & Earthea Nance, Toward Equity: Prioritizing Vulnerable
Communities in Climate Change 4 DUKE F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1-23 (2012).
312
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) third assessment
report.13 The relationship operates in a circular fashion with climate change
threatening development, and sustainable development providing the
foundation for actions in mitigation and adaptation.14 For example, water is
a primary indicator of the impacts of climate change; climate change
threatens water quality and access. Hence, sustainable development
strategy and sustainable management of water resources can help prevent
exacerbating these adverse impacts and provide a foundation for climate
adaptation and mitigation. The relationship is further cemented by the fact
that an effective shift to climate adaptation needs to be inclusive, which
again points to the broader agendas of sustainable development. The
interrelation provides synergies for integrating climate actions into the
overall development agenda. This has been underscored as part of the idea,
objective, and mandate of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly
SDG-13.15
SDG-13 focuses on strengthening the resilience and capacity of nations
to respond to climate change.16 Goal-13 adopts not only a country-specific
approach, by emphasizing the special needs of least developed countries
and small island developing States (SIDS), but also an individual approach
with special focus on women, youth and local and marginalized
communities.17 The interconnected nature of climate change and
sustainable development is not only reflected under SDG-13 but is
integrated within the broader fabric of SDGs.18 Though the Paris
Agreement does not mention SDGs explicitly, their content can be found in

13

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, in CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I, II, AND III TO THE THIRD
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 276-280,
306-308, 351, 354 (R.T. Watson & C.R. Team ed. 2001).
14
Christoph V. Stechow et al., Integrating Global Climate Change Mitigations Goals with
Other Sustainability Objectives: A Synthesis, 40 (1) ANN. REV. OF ENV’T. & RES. 363, 363
(2015); Prajal Pradhan et al., A Systematic Study of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)
Interactions, 5(11) EARTH’S FUTURE 1169, 1169–1179 (2017) (identifying the synergies and
trade-offs based on SDG indicators for climate actions).
15
U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, SDG-13.2. (emphasizing the need to integrate climate
change measures into national policies, strategies and planning).
16
Id. SDG-13.1.
17
Id. SDG-13.b.
18
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. – an IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS
AND RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF
STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 1-32, 9–13, 26 (Valérie MassonDelmotte et al. eds., 2018).
313
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the Agreement’s preamble and operative sections.19 For instance, SDG
topics such as forestry, adaptation, loss-and-damage, and education are
mentioned in the Paris Agreement’s articles 5, 7, 8, and 11(1) and 12,
respectively.20 In addition to the operative part of the Paris Agreement, the
Agreement’s preamble also references the subjects of several SDGs. These
references include food security21 (SDG-2), jobs22 (SDG-8.3 and 8.9),
health23 (SDG-3), rights of indigenous peoples, local communities,
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable
situations, etc.24 Although the SDG-related issues mentioned in the
preamble of the Paris Agreement do not entail any binding obligation, they
are relevant for interpretive purposes.25 The clear references of sustainable
development and SDG content in the preamble and operative part of the
Paris Agreement indicate the intention of the international community to
adopt an integrated approach to the implementation of the Agreement and
SDGs. An empirical investigation into the substantive content of NDCs
also reveals the broader inclusion of SDGs.26
The advancement of integrated and interrelated goals requires
transformative changes in the way societies, economies, and legal systems
operate and respond at varying levels. SDGs do not operate in isolation or
in a vacuum. They are grounded in international law which provides them
with a normative environment. SDGs are made consistent with existing
commitments expressed in various international legal instruments. In this
context, the mutually supportive relationship of international law is
paramount, which has been acknowledged by the SDGs.27 For example, the
19

See Francesco Sindico, Paris, Climate Change, and Sustainable Development, 6 CLIM.
LAW 130, 140 (2016) (assessing the extent to which the Paris Outcome incorporates the
SDGs or sustainable development concerns).
20
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Dec. 1/CP.21: Adoption of
the Paris Agreement, FCCC/ CP/2015/10/Add.1, 21, annex (Jan. 29, 2016), [hereinafter
‘Paris Agreement’].
21
Id. at 2; SDG target 2.4 provides a link between sustainable food production, resilient
agricultural practices, and climate change: “[b]y 2030, ensure sustainable food production
systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and
production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate
change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively
improve land and soil quality.” U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, ¶ 2.4.
22
Paris Agreement, supra note 20 at 2.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Max H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164(5) U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 13051329 (2016).
26
ADIS DZEBO ET AL., STOCKHOLM ENV’T. INST., THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
VIEWED THROUGH A CLIMATE LENS 1-4 (2018) (examining 7000 climate activities from 164
Nationally Determined Contributions and showing the inclusion of SDG goals).
27
U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, ¶ 18.
314
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021

7

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6

Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

contents of SDG-13 were comprehensively drawn from the concrete terms
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).28 The significance of international law as a normative
backbone for SDGs also stems from the fact that implementation of SDGs
rests on legal forums and institutions.29
In addition, the complementary nature of international law in the
context of SDGs also stems from “equity” as a normative framework for
both climate change and SDGs.30 By adopting the 2030 agenda, States
commit to “leave no one behind” and wish to see goals and targets met for
all nations and peoples and for all segments of society.31 Leaving no one
behind as it relates to equity means that the specific needs of countries,
communities, and individuals are addressed so that everyone benefits from
sustained growth and progress.32 In the context of climate change, it is the
poorest and most marginalized who suffer first and worst from its effects.33
Leaving no one behind would require prioritizing and assisting the
mitigation and adaptation efforts of the poorest countries and fighting for
the inclusion of marginalized peoples’ voices everywhere. In this case, it is
important to see that NDCs, which form the backbone of the Paris
Agreement, address and pursue the goal of leaving no one behind through
climate actions. However, given the disproportionate impact of climate
change and differing capabilities of nations to respond to climate change,
there is a strong case for allowing differing responsibilities for climate
actions at the international level. The attainment of inclusive participation
and benefits for everyone requires serious evaluation of the role of CBDR
in the sustainable development framework and climate change legal
28

Id. SDG-13.
Rakhyun E. Kim, The Nexus Between International Law and the Sustainable
Development Goals, 25(1) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 15, 16 (2016).
30
See generally Stellina Jolly & Abhishek Trivedi, Implementing the SDG-13 Through the
Adoption of Hybrid Law: Addressing Climate-Induced Displacement, 2 BRILL OPEN L. 69
(2019).
31
U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, at 1, 3 ¶ 4.
32
See generally J. ROY ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY ERADICATION AND
REDUCING INEQUALITIES, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. – an IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON
THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE
GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND
EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 445, 469 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018)
(considering the broad and multifaceted bi-directional interplay between sustainable
development, including its focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their
multidimensional aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world); Otto Spijkers,
Intergenerational Equity and the Sustainable Development Goals, 10(11) SUSTAINABILITY
1, 1-12 (2018).
33
Leichenko & Silva, supra note 10.
29

315
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regime. In this context, the concept of leaving no one behind anchored in
the SDGs Agenda 2030 provides a strong justification for a wider
interpretation of CBDR.
II.

COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The historically disproportionate contribution of countries to climate
change34 and existing disparities amongst countries in their ability to
respond to climate change has forced the international community to
deviate from the classic notion of the sovereign equality of States by
adopting a differentiation principle in terms of climate obligation.35
Even though CBDR is most discussed in the context of climate change,
it is important to mention that the concept of CBDR evolved as a legal
principle in the context of sustainable development as part of the Rio
Declaration which stated: “[I]n view of the different contributions to global
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in
view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of
the technologies and financial resources they command.”36
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration explicitly integrated CBDR within
the context of sustainable development. However, the relationship was
expressed only in the context of historical contributions of developed
countries to environmental degradation and their capacity to respond to
environmental degradation. This point is a serious bone of contention
between developed and developing nations where the latter insist on an
expansive interpretation of CBDR to be applicable to all facets of
sustainable development.37 It should be noted, however, that at the Rio
conference, sustainable development was understood to encompass only
34

STELLINA JOLLY & AMIT JAIN, CLIMATE CHANGE: CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND
POLICY 48 (2009) (highlighting the disproportionate impact of climate change).
35
See Philippe Cullet, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 161-180 (M. Fitzmaurice et al. eds.,
2014) (explaining the evolution and development of common but differentiated
responsibilities).
36
Rio Declaration, supra note 2, principle 7; see also Philippe Cullet, Principle 7: Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities, in THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 229-44 (Jorge E. Vinuales eds., 2015) (tracing the history
of CBDR in the context of sustainable development).
37
Lavanya Rajamani, The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of
International Environmental Law, 88 INT’L AFFAIRS 605, 613-614 (2012).
316
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economic and environmental dimensions.38 Subsequent legal developments
strengthened and broadened CBDR.39 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration
also broadened the gamut of sustainable development by explicitly adding
social components to sustainable development.40 The Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation (JPOI) indicates that the principle of CBDR should be
taken into account in implementing Agenda 21 and the internationallyagreed upon development goals.41
The Outcome Document of the United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development, 2012, reaffirmed the principles of the Rio
Declaration, including the principle of CBDR.42 It stated, “[w]e reaffirm all
the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 thereof.”43
Negotiations over the principles were contentious. While reaffirming
the Rio Principles, the co-chair of the negotiation proposed the following:
“[W]e also reaffirm that all the Principles contained in the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development will continue to guide the international
community in the achievement of sustainable development and the future
we want and will serve as the basis for cooperation, coherence and
implementation of agreed commitments, including in this outcome.”44 The
Group of 77 (G-77) introduced an alternative text to reaffirm the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development and all its principles, in

38

Clara Nobbe, Universality, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and the Sustainable
Development Goals 1, 3 (Stifttung Wissenschaft Und Politik, Working Paper FG 8, 2015/01,
2015), https://www.swp berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Nobbe_2015
_SWP-WorkingPaper.pdf.
39
Marie Claire C. Segger et al., Prospects for Principles of International Sustainable
Development Law after WSSD: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, Precaution and
Participation, 12(1) REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 54, 58 (2013).
40
U.N. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Resolution 1: Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development, ¶¶ 5, 8, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002);
see also Ina Von Frantzius, World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg 2002:
A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Outcomes, 13(2) ENV’T. POL. 467, 471 (2004).
41
U.N. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Resolution 2: Plan of
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, ¶¶ 14, 20, 38, 39, 81,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002); see also Kevin R. Gray, World Summit on Sustainable
Development: Accomplishments and New Directions?, 52(1) INT’L COMP. L. Q. 256, 265-66
(2003).
42
G.A. Res. A/RES/66/288, The Future We Want (July 27, 2012) [hereinafter Rio+20
Outcome Document].
43
Id. at ¶ 15.
44
Chee Yoke Ling, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” Under Threat, Third
World Network Update on Sustainable Development Conference 2012 (June 8, 2012),
https://www.twn.my/title2/sdc2012/sdc2012.120606.htm.
317
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particular the Principle of CBDR and equity.45 The United States and the
developed nations were against singling out any of the Rio Principles.46
They elucidated their position, stating that CBDR only applied in the
context of the environment and could not be protracted into the broader
context of development.47 However, for G-77 and China, the position was
non-negotiable since the developing countries believed that the principle of
CBDR is not just about the environment alone, but rather the international
pursuit of sustainable development.48 It should also be noted that in spite of
the acceptance of the CBDR principle in the environmental context, the
principle was never incorporated into the global development agenda,
including the Millennium Development Goals.49 However, this was mainly
due to the absence of emphasis on the responsibility of northern countries
and the general focus of north-south cooperation.50
The notion held by developed nations that CBDR is only applicable in
the context of global environmental goals and not for the global
development agenda resulted in its exclusion from the initial agenda for
negotiations leading to the adoption of SDGs.51 In addition, the concern
was on how to reconcile the development of goals that were “global and
universal in nature to all countries while taking into account different
national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting
national policies and priorities” prescribed by the Rio+20.52 Given the
universality of SDGs and the different capabilities of countries, linking
CBDR to the whole components of sustainable development becomes
critical. CBDR is invoked not merely to address the historical contribution
to environmental degradation, but also due to countries’ differing
45

Id.
Raymond Clemencon, Welcome to the Anthropocene: Rio+20 and the Meaning of
Sustainable Development, 21(3) J. ENV’T. DEV. 311, 316-317 (2012); Ye Jiang, Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities and Its Effect on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 54
CHINA INT’L STUD. 22, 30-31 (2015) (articulating the general position of developed nations
that common but differentiated responsibilities is not an organic part of the Post-2015
Development Agenda).
47
Achala C. Abeysinghe & Gilberto Arias, CBDR as a Principle of Inspiring Actions Rather
Than Justifying Inaction in the Global Climate Change Regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 235-257 (Oliver C. Ruppel et al. eds.,
2013) (articulating the operationalization of CBDR in the environmental dimensions of
sustainable development); Ye Jiang, The CBDR Principle in the UN 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, 2(2) CHINA Q. OF INT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES 169, 170 (2016).
48
Summary of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 13-22 JUNE
2012, 27 (51) EARTH NEGOT. BULL. 8, 16-18, 21 (2012).
49
Ye Jiang, supra note 47, at 173 (exploring the negotiation history on the inclusion of
CBDR in the U.N. 2030 Agenda).
50
Id. at 178.
51
Id. at 172-74.
52
Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 42, ¶¶ 246-47.
46
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capacities.53 The historical contribution and capacity argument can be
invoked to support the whole components of sustainable development.
Most developing nations were colonized,54 which resulted in their
economies being drained and undermining their prospects and ability to
develop. Development and underdevelopment as historical processes of
imperialist exploitation needs to occupy a larger place in the global
negotiation agendas and require clear acknowledgment and articulate
explanation. Even if the social components of sustainable development are
added to the notion of CBDR, developed countries must account for their
historical contribution to underdevelopment. Thus, equity demands that
CBDR should be given a broad interpretation to achieve the substantive
equality essential for the implementation of international laws regarding
climate change.55
During the negotiation on developing global SDGs under the mandate
of Opening Working Group (OWG),56 the G-77 and China were of the
opinion that the principle of CBDR applies equally to all dimensions of
sustainable development and to the entire set of SDGs.57 The developed
countries, however, contended that the relevance of the CBDR principle in
its application is limited to the global environmental aspect of sustainable
development.58 Finally, the presence of the differentiation principle in the
context of sustainable development and its application to the
implementation of SDGs was reaffirmed and reiterated in the OWG Report
on sustainable development submitted to the General Assembly on August
14, 2014.59 Paragraph 191 of the outcome document specifically mentions
53

Id.
Gbedoah Richard, On Colonialism and Development – Why the Underdevelopment of the
South Cannot Be Delinked from the Experience of the Past, 7(1) AFRICAN J. GOV. & DEV. 616 (2018).
55
See generally Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a
New Paradigm of Inter-State Relations, 10(3) EUR. J. OF INT’L. L. 549 (1999); Philippe
Cullet, Equity and Flexibility Mechanisms in the Climate Change Regime: Conceptual and
Practical Issues, 8(2) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 168 (1999) (explaining
equity in the context of climate change through the interpretation of CBDR).
56
Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 42, ¶ 248.
57
Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador Sacha Llorentty,
Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations and
Chair of the Group of 77, at the Ninth Session of the Open Working Group on Sustainable
Development Goals (New York, Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.g77.org/statement/
getstatement.php?id=140303c; see also China’s Position Paper on the Development Agenda
Beyond 2015, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLES’ REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept.
22, 2013), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1078984.shtml.
58
Pamela S. Chasek et al., Getting to 2030: Negotiating the Post-2015 Sustainable
Development Agenda, 25(1) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 5, 9 (2016).
59
See G.A. Res. A/68/970, Rep. of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on
Sustainable Development Goals, ¶¶ 5, 8, 12, 13, 18 (Aug. 12, 2014).
54
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CBDR in the context of climate change.60 In addition, paragraph 247 of the
outcome document espouses that the SDGs, which are global and universal
in nature, should be applicable to all countries while taking into account
different national realities, capacities and levels of development and
respecting national policies and priorities.61 Though the term CBDR is not
explicitly stated in the outcome document, which refers instead to national
realities and capabilities, the outcome document has adopted a dynamic
principle of differentiation applicable in all contexts of sustainable
development.62
The inclusion of differentiation constituted a decisive step towards the
completion of the U.N. 2030 Agenda. CBDR is crucial for strengthening
the means of implementation of SDGs and also for promoting the
revitalization of global cooperation for sustainable development. The
indivisible and integrated nature of SDGs has opened the possibility of
interpreting and implementing the CBDR principle as applying equally to
all dimensions of sustainable development and to the broader framework of
SDGs. In this context, the next part of the article explores the contours of
CBDR under the climate change legal framework and its contextualization
within sustainable development.
III.
PRINCIPLE OF ‘COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITY’ UNDER THE CLIMATE LAW FRAMEWORK
The principle of CBDR has been a contentious issue in the climate
change regime, with developed countries arguing that CBDR should be
based on “capabilities”, while developing countries emphasize the term
“responsibility.”63 Ultimately, the debate resulted in a compromise in the
form of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities” (CBDR-RC) as bases for differentiation.
The CBDR-RC is mentioned under the preamble64 and article 3 of the
UNFCCC65 as one of its guiding principles. The Kyoto Protocol, which
supplemented the Convention, applied an Annex-based model of

60

Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 42, ¶ 191.
Id. ¶ 247.
62
Nobbe, supra note 38, at 1-12; Pieter Pauw et al., Different Perspectives on Differentiated
Responsibilities: A State-of-the-Art Review of the Notion of Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities in International Negotiations 1-76, 48-50 (GERMAN DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTE DISCUSSION PAPER 6/2014, 2014), https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/
DP_6.2014.pdf.
63
DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 27 (2017).
64
UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, pmbl. ¶ 6 (May 9, 1992).
65
Id., art. 3.1.
61
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differentiation.66 The idea of CBDR was problematic from the very
beginning as many of the developed nations, especially the U.S., opposed
the idea of non-binding obligations on some of the developing nations, like
China and India.67 The opposition took a concrete turn especially from the
Bali Conference of Parties (CoP), which started working on the post-Kyoto
commitments.68 The idea that differentiation requires flexibility and
dynamism was moot.69 Following the climate negotiations, State Parties in
the Durban platform embraced the notion of “intended nationally
determined contributions” (INDCs), which continued in Warsaw (COP-19)
where it was decided to put INDCs at the heart of the future climate
agreement.70
Finally, the Paris Agreement, while diluting the traditional binary
understanding of CBDR-RC,71 approached what many experts call dynamic
differentiation, which considers different national circumstances,
capacities, and vulnerabilities and tailors differentiation to the specificities
of mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and

66

Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, arts. 2, 3 (Dec. 11, 1997)
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
67
Rowena Maguire, The Role of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the 2020
Climate Regime: Evolving a New Understanding of Differential Commitments, 7(4) CAR. &
CL. L. REV. 260, 263, 266 (2013); Paul. G. Harris, Common But Differentiated
Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy, 2 NYU ENV’T. L. J. 27, 28
(1999).
68
Lavanya Rajamani, From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly?, 57(4) INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 909, 911, 923 (2008) (explaining the controversial negotiating positions of
countries for the post Kyoto commitments).
69
Jorge Vinuales, Balancing Effectiveness and Fairness in the Redesign of the Climate
Change Regime, 24(1) LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 225, 245 (2011) (exploring the differing position
of nations concerning fairness and the developed nations perspectives of flexibility for all
nations).
70
UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19: Further Advancing the Durban Platform, UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31. 2014).
71
The principle of CBDR-RC is arguably diluted under the Paris Agreement in a sense that
it adopted a self-differentiation approach, in contrast to an annex-based approach of
differentiation tailored by the Kyoto Protocol. The weakening of the differentiation principle
under the Paris Agreement has been seen by a few commentators as a positive sign of
evolution of CBDR-RC principle towards a flexible and dynamic framework. See generally,
S. Maljean-Dubois, The Paris Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of
Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime?, 25(2) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L
ENV’T. L. 151 (2016); see also Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in Environmental
Law: Addressing Critiques and Conceptualizing the Next Steps, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T. L.
305 (2016) (taking a different approach to the CBDR-RC principle, arguing that, in a world
where inequalities remain, the differentiation principle should be developed around new
environmental and social bases and must be applied in all aspects of sustainable
development).
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transparency.72 All of these areas are directly related to the various
dimensions of sustainable development and sustainable development goals.
It would be legally implausible to argue that the “differentiation” under the
Paris Agreement goes without touching upon the aspects of sustainable
development. In other words, even though the Paris Agreement has diluted
the traditional approach of CBDR-RC, the present dynamic of
differentiation is closely related to multiple dimensions of sustainable
development.
A. Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development, and SDGs
The preamble of the Paris Agreement emphasizes the relationship of
climate change actions and responses to equitable access to sustainable
development and the eradication of poverty.73 Sustainable development and
poverty eradication are the overarching goals of the UN Agenda 2030.74
Article 2 of the Agreement goes further by setting an ambitious goal of
limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius in the context of
sustainable development.75 The Parties under article 4 have agreed to
achieve and implement the goals of the Paris Agreement including NDCs
on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development.76 In
this way, sustainable development provides a context for the State Parties
to achieve and implement the goals of the Agreement.77
72

Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira, ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDRRC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement, 5(2) TRANSNAT’L
ENV’T. L. 285, 303 (2016) (analyzing the ‘dynamic differentiation’ as built into the
architecture of the Paris Agreement); Lavanya Rajamani, The 2015 Paris Agreement:
Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations, 28(2) J. OF INT’L ENV’T. L. 337, 358
(2016); Lavanya Rajamani, Ambitions and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement:
Interpretative possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65(2) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 493 (2016)
(exploring ambition and differentiation as articulated in the test of the Agreement and its
interpretative possibilities and underlying politics).
73
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl. ¶ 8.
74
Lynda M. Collins, Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights: Challenges and
Opportunities, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: LAW, THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION
72-78 (Duncan French ed., 2018).
75
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.1.
76
Id., art. 4.1.
77
Since sustainable development and the contents of SDGs form part of the preamble and
operative part of the Paris Agreement and provide a context for the implementation of the
Agreement, they could be used in several ways including in the interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the Agreement. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1) (May 23, 1969) (saying that “A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); see Hulme, supra note 25, at 12961329 (discussing the relevance of preamble text in the interpretation of the main text of a
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Parties are further allowed to seek international cooperation in the
implementation of their NDCs,78 and thus, while engaging in such
cooperative mechanisms, they are required to promote sustainable
development, inter alia.79 The Agreement further establishes a link
between global goals on adaptation with those of sustainable development
in the sense that the domestic adaptation measures adopted by the States
should be in tune with a view to contributing to sustainable development.80
Moreover, Parties under the Paris Agreement have explicitly recognized
the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss-anddamage.81 Interestingly, SDG-13, on the other hand, also requires States to
adopt domestic measures in their implementation of mitigation and
adaptation goals.82 Thus, it is incumbent upon States to ensure that their
domestic implementation policies regarding the Paris Agreement and SDGs
are mutually supportive and do not result in a fragmented approach.83
treaty and in the reconciliation of the text-and-context and object-and-purpose approaches);
see e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 12, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) (in this case, the
Appellate Body looked at the preamble text of the WTO Agreement while giving an
interpretation of article XX of the GATT. It noted that “An environmental purpose is
fundamental to the application of article XX, and such a purpose cannot be ignored,
especially since the preamble to the [WTO Agreement] … acknowledge that the rules of
trade should be in accordance with the objective of the sustainable development.”); J.
KLABBERS, Treaties and their Preambles, in CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE MADERN LAW OF TREATIES 172-200 (M. Bowman & D. Kritsiotis eds., 2018).
78
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6.1.
79
Id., art. 6.2.
80
Id., art. 7.1.
81
Id., art. 8.1.
82
U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, SDG 13.2.
83
Mutually supportive role of SDGs and the Paris Agreement help influence the countries to
adopt an integrated approach and avoid fragmentation in their policy design regarding
climate change. As for the relevance of an integrated and coherent approach in relation to
the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. See generally David Griggs et al., An Integrated
Framework for Sustainable Development Goals, 19(40) ECOL. SOC. 49 (2014); William
Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and The Challenges of Global Environmental Law:
Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32(2) U. OF PA. J. OF INT’L L. 457, 513 (2010)
(analyzing global environmental law in the context of a plural, fragmented international
legal order); CLARA BRANDI ET AL., GERMAN DEV. INST., THE CASE FOR CONNECTING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT AND THE 2030 AGENDA FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1-4 (2017) (exploring the enormous potential for co-benefits to
arise from the mutually supportive implementation processes of the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) elaborated in the 2030 Agenda and the Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) underpinning the legally binding Paris Agreement); TARA SHINE,
SWEDISH INT’L DEV. COOPERATION AGENCY, INTEGRATING CLIMATE ACTION INTO NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND
AGENDA 2030, A GUIDE TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT PART
THREE 1-15 (2017); UNDP, GUIDELINES TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES REPORTING ON THE
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The explicit references to sustainable development and SDG content in
the preamble and operative part of the Paris Agreement indicate the
seriousness attached by the climate change regime to the operationalization
of the Agreement in the context of sustainable development.84 The
references to sustainable development and SDG content also points to the
need to adopt an integrated approach to the implementation of the
Agreement and SDGs, with a strong mandate in the field of adaptation,
loss-and-damage, and support mobilization.
In this scenario, the question is whether the Paris Agreement, with its
diluted form of the CBDR-RC principle, is capable of attaining the climate
goal of 2-degrees Celsius and the ambitious goal of 1.5-degrees Celsius in
the context of sustainable development. This article reiterates the position
of the Paris Agreement that the implementation of the Agreement is to be
in the context of sustainable development and equity. With this in mind, the
next section illustrates the significance attached to SDGs in the NDCs
submitted by State Parties.
IV.

INCORPORATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN
THE NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS

Implementation of NDCs and building climate resilience capacity are
not exclusive to the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals but are
strongly connected to the broader concept of sustainable development and
contribute substantially to the achievement of SDGs. The mutually
supportive nature of the two agendas is clear—i.e., delivering on NDCs
will help countries achieve their SDGs, and achieving the SDGs will
facilitate countries’ efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Further,
since the NDCs process is cyclical and will be assessed collectively
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 22 (2017); Norchika Kanie et al., Introduction: Global
Governance through Goal Setting,’ in GOVERNANCE THROUGH GOALS: SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 1-28 (Norchika Kanie & Frank
Biermann eds., 2017).
84
It needs to be emphasized that although the U.N. Agenda 2030 is a soft law instrument
and that the SDGs are not legally binding, they are nevertheless of great importance in many
ways including informing the interpretation of the Paris Agreement, influencing the general
international law-making process and the content of international law, and most importantly
helping to define the standards of good behavior of the states in a given context. See
generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment,
12(2) MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 420, 431-35 (1990); Tadensz Grnchalla-Wesierski, A Framework
for Understanding “Soft Law”, 30 MCGILL L. J. 38, 52-60, 70-79 (1984); Alan E. Boyle,
Some Reflection on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 901,
904-914 (1999) (discussing the legal status of treaty provisions and soft laws, this
understanding is important to appreciate inclusion of terminologies in different parts of the
treaty or agreement).
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through global stocktaking “in light of equity,”85 the SDG lens can help
countries develop more comprehensive and ambitious targets while taking
into account how NDC implementation can contribute to achieving
multiple goals of the U.N. 2030 Agenda.86 As with the SDGs, the
achievement by a Party of its NDCs is not a legally binding obligation, but
governments are expected to take ownership and establish national
frameworks for their targets.87 The Stockholm Institute studies show that
NDCs include a large number of climate activities that are also relevant to
achieving multiple SDGs.88 As of now, 186 State Parties have submitted
their first NDCs and many States mention in their NDCs, directly or
indirectly, concerns about sustainable development and SDGs.
For instance, India’s NDC refers to sustainable development and
sustainable development goals of poverty eradication, food security, and
nutrition, universal access to education and health, gender equality and
women empowerment, water and sanitation, energy, employment,
sustainable urbanization and new human settlements, and the means of
implementation for enhanced actions.89 India’s broad policy framework on
environment and climate change as highlighted in its NDC and laid down
by the National Environmental Policy (NEP, 2006) and National Action
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC, 2008) along with several other national
strategies and policies, such as Energy Conservation Act (2001), focus on
achieving sustainable development with the imperatives of economic and
social justice.90

85

Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 14.1.
See Eliza Northrop et al., Examining the Alignment Between the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions And Sustainable Development Goals, WORLD RESOURCE INST. 1,
2, 13 (2016), https://www.wri.org/publication/examining-alignment-between-intendednationally-determined-contributions-and-sustainable (demonstrating that climate actions
communicated in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris
Agreement have the potential to generate mutual benefits with at least 154 of the 169 SDG
targets); Jennifer Huang, What Can the Paris Agreement’s Global Stocktake Learn from the
Sustainable Development Goals?, 12(3) CAR. & CL. L. REV. 218- 228 (2018) (undertaking a
review of the potential similarities and differences in the review, reporting cycles, and
outcomes, measuring progress, managing technical expert input, sharing knowledge,
information and experience, of SDGs and climate change and suggesting that SDGs could
provide some relevant lessons for international climate negotiations).
87
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4(2); see generally Christina Voigt, The Paris
Agreement: What is the Standard of Conduct for Parties?, 26 QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. 17, 1920 (2016).
88
See generally, Dzebo, supra note 26.
89
India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working towards Climate Justice,
UNFCCC 4 (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx
(follow “India First NDC” English language hyperlink).
90
Id. at 7.
86
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Similarly, Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, while adopting
a low carbon pathway, have mainstreamed climate and environmental
considerations with a sustainable development agenda.91 The Maldives has
even made the explicit reference of sustainable development as a context
for its conditional target of a 24% reduction in Green House Gases (GHGs)
below business as usual (BAU) for the year 2030.92 Thus, the Maldives
believes that its domestic budgetary spending on addressing climate change
would remain an additional burden towards the achievement of sustainable
development.93 The group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
(BRICS) countries have also mentioned sustainable development as a
context and basis in the formulation and implementation of their NDCs
based on equity and equitable access to sustainable development. For
instance, South Africa believes that the principles of equity and sustainable
development are the basis of its NDCs, and equity applies to adaptation,
mitigation and all forms of investment and support.94 In this context, South
Africa further mentions that equity, economic and social development, and
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities for the effective
implementation of its NDCs.95 Brazil is also committed to enhancing its
contribution towards global efforts to hold the increase in global average
temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels in the context of
sustainable development and access to financial and technological means.96
Concerns about sustainable development are not specific to the NDCs
of developing and least developed nations. Many member countries to the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) have increasingly aligned their
climate change policy with sustainable development objectives. For
instance, Trinidad and Tobago, while adopting a low carbon development
plan through the National Climate Change Policy, is willing to achieve an
91

Afghanistan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 3-4 (Sept. 21,
2015); Sri Lanka’s Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1 (Sept., 2016); Nepal’s
Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC 5, 9 (Oct. 2016); Pakistan’s Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1 (Nov. 10, 2016). NDC submissions for
each country can be accessed at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx.
92
Maldives’ Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 3 (Sept. 2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Maldives First NDC”
hyperlink).
93
Id. at 10.
94
South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 10 (Nov. 1,
2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “South Africa
First NDC” hyperlink).
95
Id. at 7.
96
Brazil’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards Achieving the Objectives
of the UNFCCC, Additional Information on the INDC for Clarification Purposes Only,
UNFCCC 1 (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx
(follow “Brazil’s First NDC” hyperlink).
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optimal energy mix with the lowest GHGs emissions in order to ensure a
sustainable development path with significant co-benefits in terms of
enhancing its ability to cope with and adapt to the adverse impacts of
climate change.97 In contrast, Tuvalu believes that climate change is a
cross-cutting development issue, which seriously undermines its efforts
towards sustainable development and climate change resilience, and
threatens the survival and sovereignty of the nation.98
The assessed NDCs broadly reveal not only climate action goals but
also the strong alignment and de jure sustainable development plans deeply
rooted in the U.N. 2030 Agenda.99 Two things are important to note here.
First, these countries viewed sustainable development as an objective to be
achieved in all three areas of environmental, economic and social
development. Second, these countries provided sustainable development as
a context and basis for NDCs implementation in the areas of not only
mitigation but also adaptation, and support. SDGs rooted in the principle of
leaving no one behind have been given a place of prominence in a majority
of NDCs reiterating the complementarity of the goals specified in the two
regimes. The strong emphasis on sustainable development in the NDCs
reflects the intention of countries to advance the implementation of the
Paris Agreement in the context of sustainable development. It should also
be emphasized that case law jurisprudence has highlighted the
commitments of governments to meet climate change targets set up by the
Paris Agreement with the objective of contributing to the achievement of
sustainable development.100 These cases vividly highlight the significance
97

Trinidad and Tobago’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 2, 3
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow
“Trinidad and Tobago First NDC” hyperlink).
98
Tuvalu’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC 9, 10 (Nov. 27, 2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Tuvalu First NDC”
hyperlink).
99
Dzebo, supra note 26, at 1-2.
100
See generally Gloucester Resources Ltd. v. Minister for Planning, NSWLEC 7, 491, 52549, 556, 664, 695 (2019). In this case, the Court rejected the approval of a proposed opencut coal mine – Gloucester Resources Ltd – based on the grounds of social, environmental
and climate change considerations. The court noted that the exploitation of the coal
resources in the Gloucester Valley would not be a sustainable use and would cause
substantial environmental and social harm, and that the project’s GHGs emissions would
contribute to global climate change degradation. Therefore, the Planning Department under
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 should consider the climate
change impacts, including the cumulative upstream and downstream GHGs emissions, of
the project because the Act together with its regulations require the considerations of the
principles of ecologically sustainable development which can encompass climate change
impacts. Finally the court held that the Gloucester Valley coal mine project is not a
sustainable use as it would cause adverse impacts on climate change and incur high
environmental and social costs. See Lesley Hughes, The Rocky Hill Decision: A Watershed
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attached by legal systems in responding to the Paris Agreement targets
connecting some SDGs to the concept of sustainable development.
Since international law forms the backbone of SDG implementation,
the achievement of climate goals and SDGs for everyone requires a
stronger focus on equity and in the climate context, the expansive
interpretation of CBDR in NDCs. The following sections enumerate how
an expansionist interpretation of CBDR can be applicable to the
implementation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, as NDCs constitute
the primary mechanism of implementation strategy under the Paris
Agreement.
V.

INCORPORATING CBDR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NDCs
The concept of NDCs under the Agreement lies at the heart of the
climate change regime, where State Parties are given extensive discretion
to decide their GHG reduction target domestically and report them
internationally. Article 4 of the Agreement deals in detail with the issue of
mitigation, i.e. NDCs, where each State is required to “prepare,
communicate and maintain successive” NDCs that it intends to achieve.101
The methods of implementation of these NDCs are chosen by concerned
State Parties by adopting any domestic measures including legislation,
rules, regulations, or any other policy measures. The overarching issues of
the Paris Agreement: fairness, transparency framework, global stock-take,
ambitious cycle, and means of implementation form the entry points for
incorporating CBDR differentiation in NDCs. This article, while arguing
for the expansive interpretation of CBDR, does not advocate for the
retention of the binary divide between Annex countries. This article
promotes the concretization of the developed, developing and vulnerable
categories of countries specified under the Paris Agreement. The call for an
expansionist interpretation of CBDR in NDCs should not be understood in
the limited context of simply achieving the climate temperature goal of 2
degrees Celsius. Instead, it is more about the process and methods of
for Climate Change Action, 37(3) J. OF ENV’T. & NAT. RES. L. 341 (2019); Plan B Earth v.
Secretary of State for Transport, EWCA Civ. 214 (2020) (UK). In this case the UK appellate
court declined the decision of the government approving an expansion of Heathrow
International Airport without considering its commitment to meeting the Paris Agreement
goals. The court held that since the Paris Agreement goals form part of the “Government
Policy,” the Secretary must consider and address the Paris Agreement goals during the
preparation of the Airport National Policy Statement. And since the government failed to
consider the Paris Agreement goals, it acted in violation of the Planning Act of 2008 and the
requirement to undertake a strategic environmental assessment. See also JACQUELINE PEEL
& HARI OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: LESSONS AND PATHWAYS (2017).
101
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4.2.
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achieving that goal based on equity and in light of sustainable development
and efforts to eradicate poverty. Given the complementary relationship and
significance of SDGs and climate change, fair and equitable preparation of
NDCs is crucial in the attainment of SDG targets, as the implementation
and operationalization of the Paris Agreement is mainly envisaged through
NDCs, which outline countries’ contributions to reduce or limit GHGs
emissions. Without an adequate reference to and incorporation of equity in
NDCs, the goal of the Paris Agreement and the hope of attaining the SDGs
would be impossible to achieve. With this in mind, the following
subsections will explore the ways and methods of incorporating CBDR and
promoting equity in the implementation of NDCs.
A. Promoting Equity through Fairness Requirement of NDCs
The effective implementation of the Paris Agreement is envisaged in
the context of sustainable development and equity.102 Hence, it is
imperative that the process leading to the preparation, accounting,
implementation and compliance procedures relating to NDCs includes
considerations promoting equity and fairness. An assessment of the Paris
Agreement and the agreed Paris Rulebook for implementation shows an
entry point for incorporating equity and fairness. Despite the
interdisciplinary and philosophical nature associated with the idea of
equity, most scholars have considered the incorporation of equity essential
for the dynamic operation of climate governance.103 It is to be noted that
equity under the climate change regime is operationalized through the
application of the principle of CBDR-RC.104 Though the UNFCCC has
never formally adopted any criteria to measure equity, considerations
implicit in the UNFCCC can be used to infuse the virtues of CBDR-RC in
the implementation of NDCs.
The Paris Agreement especially mentions that each State is required to
explain the factors and parameters regarding the fairness and ambitious
consideration, and how the NDCs will contribute to the collective goals of

102

Id., arts. 2.1, 2.2.
See Rebecca J. Howard et al., Which “Fairness”, for Whom, and Why? An Empirical
Analysis of Plural Notions of Fairness in Fairtrade Carbon Projects, using Q methodology,
56 ENV’T. SCI. & POL’Y. 100-109 (2016); Mark Fleurbaey et al., Sustainable Development
and Equity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 317-321 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014); Bodansky et al., supra
note 63, at 26-30, 51-53; BENOIT MAYER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CLIMATE CHANGE
27-31 (2018).
104
UNFCCC, supra note 64, art. 3.1.
103
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the Agreement and the Convention.105 However, it is built upon the
flexibility granted to each country to interpret the extent of their proposed
commitments and the parameters they consider equitable. This provision
can form an entry point for assessing the incorporation of equity in the
implementation of NDCs. In the absence of any common parameters
applicable to assessing the adequacy of evaluation by each State Party, it is
imperative that common parameters be developed. CBDR could be one of
the guiding principles for promoting fairness because equity and fairness
under the climate change regime are channeled through application of the
principle of CBDR-RC.106 Any method or benchmark for the evaluation of
NDCs mitigation efforts should be fairly balanced between equity and
stringent requirements for achieving the temperature goal of 2 degree
Celsius. This is not to argue for sacrificing the Paris Agreement goal of 2
degrees Celsius on the altar of equity. This paper argues that the process of
achieving the 2 degrees Celsius goal is equally as important an
achievement as the goal itself. The Paris Agreement also clearly reflects
this point when it states that implementation should reflect equity and the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.107 Studies have
focused on providing a comprehensive overview of equity criteria ranging
from allocation-based, objective-based, and process-based criteria,
applicable in the context of climate change implementation.108 In this
regard, it should be pointed out that though most of the controversy
surrounding fairness is centered around responsibility and capacity, the
decisive point of fairness conceptions in climate negotiations centered
around whether a country is listed as an ‘Annex’ country under the Kyoto

105

UNFCCC, ‘Decision 4/CMA.1: Further Guidance in relation to the mitigation section of
decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 annex I, sect. 6 (Mar.19, 2019).
106
See Friedrich Soltau, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY
187 (2009) (mentioning that the principle of CBDR ‘gives effect to conceptions of equity
and fairness in international environmental law’ generally and climate change law
particularly); see also Daria Shapovalova, In Defence of the Principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, in DEBATING CLIMATE LAW 2-4
(Benoit Mayer and Alexander Zahar eds., 2021, forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3652184 (advancing the argument that the principle of
CBDR-RC is indispensable for the achievement of equity under climate change regime).
107
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.2.
108
Yann Robiou du Pont et al., Equitable Mitigation to Achieve the Paris Agreement Goals,
7(1) NATURE CLIM. CHANGE 38-43 (2017) (study identifying global cost-optimal mitigation
scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement goals and allocating their emissions
dynamically to countries according to equity approaches); Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris
Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well below 2 °C, 534
NATURE 631-639 (2016).
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Protocol.109 This is because the differentiation under the Kyoto protocol
was characterized by a firewall with legally binding and country-specific,
quantitative mitigation targets for Annex I Parties only.110 The shift in
structure towards self-differentiation in the Paris Agreement through NDCs
mainly resulted from a lack of consensus on fundamental burden-sharing
principles.111 Under the Paris Agreement, Parties are obliged to submit
NDCs every five years and are requested to justify their contribution as
“fair and ambitious” through self-differentiation.112 Article 2 of the Paris
Agreement specifically directs that implementation. Commitments should
“reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances.”113
Rajamani and Bodansky write that as for the long-standing contentious
issue of equity, although the Paris Rulebook does not prescribe parameters
for assessing how States’ NDCs are to be fair and ambitious, the mere
requirement that countries have to provide explanations and justifications
about how their NDCs are fair and ambitious might enable and open the
door to more focused criticism by others.114 It gives an opportunity for
public scrutiny of NDCs. Thus, the question of fairness in effort-sharing
will continue to be relevant in the future cycle established by the
Agreement. Therefore, it is crucial that climate negotiations approach the
issue with a dynamic prism since the Annex division is not applicable. One
of the plausible approaches in this direction could be to fix an emission
allowance on the basis of specific equity principles discussed in the IPCC
AR5,115 without necessarily compromising the equity considerations and
109

See generally, Benito Muller, EQUITY IN CLIMATE CHANGE: THE GREAT DIVIDE (Oxford
Inst. for Energy Studies, 2002) 1-2, 13-15 (explaining the north–south perception with
regard to equity in climate change and highlighting the perspective of Annex and non–
Annex countries). An assumption can be made that more than the philosophical
underpinnings of equity, the concerns of the countries were on the division between Annex
and non-Annex countries since the non-Annex countries were exempted from quantified
emission. The exemption granted to countries like China and India became the primary
reason for the United States’ non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
110
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 66, arts. 2.1 and 3.1; see also, Bodansky, supra note 63,
at 165-69 (detailing the nuances of differentiation under the Kyoto Protocol).
111
Hugh Breakey, COP20’s Ethical Fallout: The Perils of Principles Without Dialogue, 18
(2) ETHICS, POL’Y & ENV’T. 155-168 (2015).
112
See Draft decision to the Paris Agreement, supra note 20, ¶ 27.
113
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.
114
Lavanya Rajamani & Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Rulebook: Balancing the International
Prescriptiveness with National Discretion, 68 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 1023, 1031 (2019).
115
Leon Clarke et al., Assessing Transformation Pathways, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE – CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 413, 457,
478 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds, 2014); see also Glen P. Peters et al., Measuring a Fair and
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efficacy requirements of NDCs. These equity principles are reflective of
several equitable considerations including historical responsibility, equal
individual rights, economic capability, cost-effectiveness, legitimate right
to development, responsibility, capacity and need, equal cumulative per
capita emissions, and staged approaches.116 In this regard, it may be pointed
out that the reference to historical responsibility need not merely refer to
emissions from the beginning of the industrial revolution and the automatic
exclusion of recent years’ emissions. Historical responsibility can be
looked at from a dynamic perspective as current emissions represent future
historical responsibility. Thus, the equity criteria would need to be viewed
from a progressive perspective, requiring regular evaluation. Scholars have
empirically analyzed selected NDCs based on a host of parameters
including the criteria proposed above. These studies have revealed that the
NDCs of the U.S. and the European Union lack ambition with respect to
responsibility and that China’s NDC projection falls short of satisfying any
approach in 2030.117 Further, the study conducted by Xunzhang Pan, et al.
comparing the NDCs of the top six emitters, jointly accounting for about
70% of the world’s CO2 emissions, revealed that the NDCs of four
developed countries, including the United States, lack ambition with
respect to most allocations under 2°C and all under 1.5°C, indicating the
need to increase the targets under all the components of NDCs
substantially.118 These empirical evaluations of NDCs and revelations about
their lack of ambition further indicate the need to evolve a mechanism of
common parameters against which nations' efforts can be measured.
The above-mentioned equity considerations to assess the fairness
requirements of NDCs are significant for many reasons. Currently, NDCs
reflect a national view on what a single country’s contribution should be,
both in terms of capability and fairness.119 The combined perspective of
Ambitious Climate Agreement using Cumulative Emissions, 10 ENV’T. RES. LETT. 1, 3
(2015) (allocating global emissions to keep global warming below 2 °C by 2100, two
approaches are followed: an “equity” approach based on population, and an “inertia”
approach based on current shares of global emissions).
116
Niklas Höhne et al., Regional GHG Reduction Targets Based on Effort Sharing: A
Comparison of Studies, 14(1) CLIM. POL’Y, 122-147 (2014); M. Davide et al., Fairness in
NDCs: Comparing Mitigation Efforts from an Equity Perspective, UNFCCC 1-16 (Oct.
2017), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/312_Fairness%20in%20NDCs.%20
Comparing%20mitigation%20efforts%20from%20an%20equity%20perspective.pdf; X. Pan
et al., Exploring Fair and Ambitious Mitigation Contributions under the Paris Agreement
Goals, 74 ENV’T. SCI. & POL’Y 49-56 (2017).
117
Davide et al., supra note 116, at 9-12.
118
Xunzhang Pan et al., Comparing and Evaluating the Nationally Determined
Contributions of the Top Six Emitters Under the Paris Agreement Goals, 16 CHINESE J.
OF POP. RES. & ENV’T. 211, 211-19 (2018).
119
Davide, supra note 116, at 12.
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each nation must advance the Paris Agreement’s core objective in a manner
reflective of equity and the principle of CBDR-RC, in the light of different
national circumstances.120 Reference to commonly defined equity criteria
can objectively advance different national circumstances. Further, these
considerations and approaches can be used to compare emissions targets in
NDCs reflecting differential equity; such an assessment could be the
foundation for reviewing NDCs by 2030 and dividing the emissions gap
amongst countries equitably. The current pattern of self-certification based
on self-selected benchmarks can hardly be considered to advance the
ambitious nature of the Paris Agreement.121 Commonly identified equity
parameters would help account for the nuanced categorization involved in
fairness considerations and the ambitious nature of the Paris Agreement.
B. Promoting Equity through International Support and
Conditional NDCs
Equity enacted through CBDR-RC is widely argued as one of the
justifications for providing international support122 for two broad reasons.
First, “solidarity” between higher-capacity countries and countries with less
capacity to deal with climate change.123 Second, those who have
contributed the most to global GHG emissions have the highest
responsibility and should support those who have contributed the least and
who are generally likely to face worse impacts.124 Providing international
120

Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 2, 4.1, 4.3.
Harald Winkler et al., Countries Start to Explain How Their Climate Contributions Are
Fair: More Rigour Needed, 18(1) INT’L ENV’T. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 99, 99-115
(2018) (studying 163 INDCs and analyzing how countries have applied different selfselected equity parameters (such as countries’ small share in global emissions, per capita
emissions, and vulnerability argument) to explain the equity of mitigation and adaptation in
their respective INDCs. They find that aggregate effect of INDCs will not be sufficient to
keep global temperature increase well below 2 degrees Celsius).
122
In this paper, international support is interchangeably used as “means of implementation”
or “support.” International support under the U.N. climate change regime for the purpose of
this paper is understood in terms of providing financial assistance and facilitating
technology transfer to, and strengthening and investing in capacity-building measures of,
developing countries.
123
Rob Dellink et al., Sharing the Burden of Financing Adaptation to Climate Change,
19(4) GLOBAL ENV’T. CHANGE 411, 411-21 (2009) (mentioning that richer countries should
pay more based on a principle of solidarity, irrespective of whether there is evidence that
they have directly or indirectly caused harm. The authors use the paradigms of “historical
responsibility” and “capacity to pay” in order to propose burden-sharing arrangements
assigning individual countries a share of the financial burden regarding climate adaptation
costs).
124
Carola Klöck et al., Responsibility, Capacity, Greenness or Vulnerability? What Explains
the Levels of Climate Aid Provided by Bilateral Donors?, 27(5) ENV’T. POL. 892 (2018)
121
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support would also enhance distributive equity internationally. The
challenge, however, is to distribute the support equitably and to prioritize
the area of climate change between mitigation and adaptation.
Under the enhanced transparency framework, the Paris Agreement
requires developed countries to report on international support provided,125
whereas developing countries should report on the support needed and
received.126 The requirement of international support can be explicitly
pronounced as part of NDCs. There is no provision in the Paris Agreement
which prohibits, directly or indirectly, developed countries from
mentioning their reporting obligation as part of their respective NDCs. In
this way, the inclusion by developed countries in their NDCs of reporting
obligations on support would be an addition and does not require an
overhauling of the Agreement. Explicit mention of international support
can also assist countries in fulfilling the criteria and passing the fairness
requirement of NDCs discussed above. The U.S. and the EU and its
member States mention, without any reference to sustainable development,
equity, or information regarding support provided to developing or least
developed countries, that their economy-wide target of reducing GHGs
emissions are “fair and ambitious.”127 However, it is strange and not legally
in tune with the long-term goals128 of the Paris Agreement for developed
countries not to give due consideration in their NDCs to providing relevant
information on support delivered to developing countries.
The need to explicitly provide for international support in NDCs is
further supported by the fact that India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,
Afghanistan, and the Maldives, among other nations, have explicitly made
the implementation of their NDCs conditional upon international support in
the form of financing, technology transfers and/or capacity building.129
Afghanistan’s NDC, for instance, says that it would have a “conditional”
(explaining that countries with more “capacity to pay” are more willing to provide for
climate aid).
125
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13.9.
126
Id., art. 13.10.
127
The USA’s First Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1 (2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/pages/Party.aspx (follow “USA First NDC
(Archived)” hyperlink); Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its
Member States, UNFCCC 1, 3 (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/pages/Party.aspx?party=EUU (follow “European
Union First NDC (Archived) hyperlink).
128
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 4.1, 4.19, 7.2, 10.5, 14.1.
129
NDC of Sri Lanka, supra note 91, at 5-7, 23-24; NDC of Afghanistan, supra note 91, at 1,
6-7; NDC of Maldives, supra note 92, at 2-3; Bangladesh’s Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDC), UNFCCC 1, 2-4 (Sept. 2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Bangladesh First NDC
(Archived)” hyperlink) [hereinafter NDC of Bangladesh].
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13.6% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to a BAU 2030
scenario.130 Similarly, they have consistently argued in their NDCs that
because of their historically minimal contribution to climate degradation
and the least capacity for climate resilience, they must be supplied with, as
a matter of fairness and equity, international support in the form of
financial assistance, technology transfers and investment in areas of
capacity building, such as agriculture, food security, irrigation, and its
power sector, among other things.131 In this way, countries have
incorporated in their NDCs the principle of CBDR which emphasizes that
the success of the implementation of their NDCs depends on the support
they receive from developed countries.
According to one analysis, around 136 out of 168 NDCs are
conditional upon at least one type of support: around 113 NDCs request
capacity building support, with 110 NDCs for mitigation ﬁnance, 109
NDCs for technology transfers, and 79 NDCs for adaptation ﬁnance.132
Furthermore, out of the 110 NDCs requesting mitigation support, 17 are
fully conditional and 93 are partly conditional. Notably, a higher proportion
of LDCs and SIDS have conditional NDCs on mitigation than do other
countries.133 Overall, around 64 (or 58%) of the countries with conditional
NDCs on mitigation ﬁnance are either LDCs or SIDS (or both).134 This
shows that the “solidarity” justiﬁcation for allocating international support
to countries with the least capacity is more pronounced.135 As with
mitigation finance, the proportion of LDCs and SIDS proposing conditional
adaptation actions is much higher than other countries: more than 60% of
the countries putting forward adaptation finance as a condition are SIDS
and LDCs, and most of them are lower-income countries.136 Thus,
providing international support to these countries seems to be consistent
with the equity-based justifications of “solidarity” and “responsibility.”137
Though providing for flexibility, conditional NDCs bring uncertainty
and may seriously affect the feasibility of their implementation.138
130

NDC of Afghanistan, supra note 91, at 1.
Id. at 2; see also NDC of Bangladesh, supra note 129, at 9, 12; NDC of
Maldives, supra note 92, at 5-11; INDC of India, supra note 89, at 2-3.
132
W. P. Pauw et al., Conditional Nationally Determined Contributions in the Paris
Agreement: Foothold for Equity or Achilles Heel?, 20(4) CLIM. POL’Y 468, 468-70,
473 (2020).
133
Id. at 475.
134
Id. at 478.
135
See generally Angela Williams, Solidarity, Justice and Climate Change Law, 10(2)
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 493, 509 (2009).
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Pauw et al., supra note 132, at 477.
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Klöck et al., supra note 124, at 893, 898.
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Pauw et al., supra note 132, at 481-82.
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Therefore, countries are expected to provide more clarity on their
conditional NDCs with detailed information regarding calculated and
credible cost estimates.139 This uncertainty can be further ameliorated by
operationalizing the CBDR-RC principle of support to developing
countries for the implementation of NDCs,140 as an explicit requirement of
NDCs. This will provide a factual calculation as to the cost of
implementation of all conditional NDCs and the assistance offered as
international support. In the absence of information regarding support,
developed countries’ claims regarding their NDCs being fair and ambitious
are not faithful to the central features and spirit of the Paris Agreement. In
this context, the next subsection discusses how information regarding
support is an essential part of equity requirements, transparency
frameworks, and global stock-taking.
C. Promoting Equity through Global Stock-take and
Transparency Framework
The Paris Agreement’s “ambition cycle” includes the binding
obligation of each State to communicate an NDC every ﬁve years,141 the
normative expectation of “progression” and the “highest possible ambition”
in each successive NDC,142 and a global stock-take to assess collective
progress towards long-term goals and to inform the Parties in updating and
enhancing their successive NDCs and support.143 Notably, the provision on
global stock-take explicitly covers the areas of “mitigation, adaptation, and
the means of implementation.”144 In addition, the Paris Rulebook further
expands the scope of global stock-take that may take into account efforts
related to its work addressing the socio-economic consequences of
response measures and the loss-and-damage associated with the adverse
effects of climate change.145 In this regard, the SDGs’ approach towards

139

Id.
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4.5.
141
Id., art. 4.2 read with art 4.9.
142
Id., art. 4.3 (also placing expectations that NDCs will reflect Parties’ “common but
diﬀerentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of diﬀerent national
circumstances”).
143
Id., art. 14.
144
Id., art. 14.1.
145
UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties
to the Paris Agreement on the Third Part of its First Session, Held in Katowice from 2 to 15
December 2018, dec. 19/CMA.1 para. 6(b)(i)-(iii), FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (Mar. 19,
2019) [hereinafter UNFCCC Katowice Decisions].
140
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adaptation can be useful in global stock-take to address the concerns
regarding climate change adaptation.146
The issue of equity in the context of global stock-take was a
contentious matter during the Rulebook negotiations. For instance, the
Africa Group argued that the application of objective indicators, such as
historical responsibility, cumulative per capita emissions, different
responding capacity due to different development levels, and sustainable
development, would offer greater precision and rigor in assessing the extent
to which Parties’ contributions address equity concerns.147 On the other
hand, many developed countries objected to the application of such
indicators arguing that the indicators could lead to selectivism, thus
rendering the stock-take a contentious exercise.148 As a result of this, the
Paris Rulebook does not identify and provide for the use of objective
indicators of equity in the stock-take. However, the rules do provide that
equity should form part of the input to the global stock-take, in a balanced,
holistic and comprehensive manner while taking into account equity
considerations and best available science.149
In addition to the issue of equity, the Paris Rulebook further requires
the State Parties to provide, as inputs to the stock-take, the information
regarding the state of adaptation efforts, ﬁnance ﬂows, and efforts relating
to loss and damage.150 This can be an entry point for State Parties,
particularly developed country Parties, to include information regarding
support in their NDCs, thus promoting equity and making their NDCs fair
in a realistic sense.
Though the Paris Rulebook provides entry points for countries to infuse
equity considerations through the global stock-take process, how the
assessment of the adequacy of individual contributions would be carried
out is beyond the scope of the Paris Agreement as the stock-take allows
only assessment of collective progress of countries.151 Nevertheless, using a
transparency framework, where all countries are to provide information
explaining how their NDCs are fair and ambitious, would help inject equity

146

Huang, supra note 86, at 224-26, 228 (also arguing that since the processes of climate
change regime and SDGs are complementary in several ways, they should evolve hand-inhand with systematic integration of the several relevant aspects of the two regimes with a
view to enhance coherence and reduce redundancies).
147
UNFCCC, Submission by the Republic of Mali on Behalf of the African Group of
Negotiators on Views on Issues Discussed Under Agenda Item 6 1, 1-3 (Apr. 2017),
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_nov_2017/application/pdf/compilation_26072017.pdf.
148
Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1031.
149
Decision 19/CMA.1, supra note 145, ¶¶ 2, 13, 27, 36(h).
150
Id. ¶ 35.
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Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1037.
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into global stock-take.152 Consequently, since equity forms part of the input
and outcome of all components of stock-take, it would inform countries of
the need for successive NDCs to be ambitious. However, it is essential to
reiterate the fact that since all countries are not to be placed in the same
category for the purpose of discharging their part of commitments,
including those undertaken as part of the transparency framework of the
Paris Agreement, there should be some criteria that can be used to classify
the world’s countries into different categories corresponding to States’
obligations based on equity. With this in mind, the next part seeks to
explore the criteria that can be employed to categorize and define world
countries for the purpose of climate change.
D. Promoting Equity by Adopting Nuanced Categorization of
World Countries
Most of the opposition to the Convention and Protocol stems from their
stringent version of differentiation with almost all the burden placed on
developed nations and almost no binding obligations on non-annexed
countries.153 However, as pointed out by Rajmani, though the Paris
Agreement has done away with the binary classification, it still retains the
differentiation through reference to an undefined group of developed,
developing, and vulnerable nations.154 The Paris Agreement makes a
differentiation between developed and developing countries an integral
feature, with developed countries taking the lead and developing countries
needing the means of implementation as well as needing to ensure
sustainable development, poverty eradication and innovation.155 For
instance, developed countries are expected to undertake economy-wide
absolute emission reduction targets, while developing countries are only
“encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction
or limitation targets” as it suits their national circumstances.156 This
differentiation points to the fact that the Paris Agreement desired to treat
developed and developing nations differently, and this provides a valid
entry point for bringing differentiation into the NDCs implementation. This
reference to the undefined category also points to the future, and challenges
152

Harald Winkler, Putting Equity into Practice in the Global Stocktake under the Paris
Agreement, 20 CLIM. POL’Y 124, 124-132 (2020).
153
Philippe Cullet, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 28
(1st ed. 2003); Cullet, supra note 71, at 327-28; Harris, supra note 67, at 41-42;
Rajamani, supra note 37, at 615.
154
See generally Rajamani, supra note 72.
155
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl., arts 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 9.7, 10.5, 11.3,
13.9, and 14.1.
156
Id., art. 4.4.
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climate negotiations to identify and resolve the categorization of
differentiation between “developed” and “developing” countries.
1. Attempting to categorize and define the world
countries
The Paris Agreement has not defined developed and developing
nations or other vulnerable categories. The existing classifications based on
the Annex system of the UNFCCC do not give a clear reference point to
define developed and developing countries.157 This leaves the question of
how to define or classify the world countries into different categories or
groups for the purpose of climate change regime unanswered. Outside the
climate change regime, different methodologies have been adopted to
classify world countries into different categories based on either economic
criteria158 or a self-selection method.159 Whether the climate change regime
should follow the method of “self-selection,” or some other objective
criteria based on multiple factors and subject to expert review would be
more justifiable to the overall context of climate change. The examples of
157

Izzet Ari & Ramazan Sari, Differentiation of Developed and Developing Countries for
the Paris Agreement, 18 ENERGY STRATEGY REV. 175, 175, 179-180 (2017).
158
For instance, the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) classifies world
countries into one of three broad categories: developed economies, economies in transition
and developing economies. The criteria followed by WESP is purely based on economic
indicators including their level of development as measured by per capita gross national
income (GNI). Accordingly, countries have been grouped as high-income, upper-middleincome, lower-middle-income and low-income. WESP further includes the list of least
developed countries as decided upon by the United Nations Economic and Social Council,
and the criteria followed there include a certain level of threshold with regard to per capita
GNI, a human assets index, and an economic vulnerability index. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L
ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, COMM. FOR DEV. POLICY, HANDBOOK ON THE LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRY CATEGORY: INCLUSION, GRADUATION AND SPECIAL SUPPORT MEASURES, at 1-14,
U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.A.9 (2008). While WESP follows exchange-rate based method
(aggregation methodology), the IMF and the World Bank follow and estimate world and
regional economic growth based on purchasing power parity (PPP) weights and GNA per
capita (Atlas Model), respectively. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD
ECON. SITUATION & PROSPECTS, 163-65 (U.N., New York 2020), https://www.un.org/
development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2020 _Annex.pdf; How Does the
World Bank Classify Countries?, THE WORLD BANK, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org
/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries.
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) follows a self-selection method. It recognizes
preferential treatment given to the developing and least-developed countries. The WTO
system, however, does not provide any definition of developing and developed countries,
but the State members announce for themselves on the basis of the self-selection method
whether they are “developed” or “developing” countries. See Who Are the Developing
Countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e
/devel_e/d1who_e.htm.
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“self-selection” are to be found in several NDCs submitted by States so far.
For instance, while Qatar, India, and Pakistan, among others, identify
themselves in their NDCs as developing countries,160 Bangladesh161,
Bhutan, Tuvalu and Nepal, among others, distinguish themselves as leastdeveloped countries.162 Similarly, Dominica, Marshall Islands, Singapore,
and Trinidad and Tobago, among others, call themselves SIDS.163 There are
few countries, for instance, Kiribati and Tuvalu, who are identified both as
SIDS and LDC.164
The Paris Agreement does envisage differentiation, and it does not
merely differentiate between developed and developing nations but in
many places provides special provisions which are envisaged for
vulnerable categories, such as LDCs, SIDS, etc.165 The need is to evolve
some concrete mechanism of categorization between Parties which could
be applicable in the implementation of NDCs. However, the idea of
differentiation has been a matter of great conflict in the negotiation. G-77
and other developing countries have been insisting on a clear
differentiation between developed and developing countries specifically
relating to NDCs.166 However, at the negotiation leading to the Paris
Rulebook at Katowice, developed countries, such as the U.S. and the
Umbrella group have demanded that the differentiation be diluted further
and in many cases parity be set between emerging economies and
160

NDC of Pakistan, supra note 91, at 5; NDC of India, supra note 89, at 4-5; State of
Qatar’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC 1, 2 (Nov. 2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Qatar First NDC
(Archived)” English language hyperlink).
161
NDC of Bangladesh, supra note 129, at 9.
162
NDC of Nepal, supra note 91, at 1; Kingdom of Bhutan Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions, UNFCCC 1, (Sep. 30, 2015)
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Bhutan First NDC
(Archived)” hyperlink).
163
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of the Commonwealth of
Dominica, UNFCCC 1 (Sept. 2015)
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Dominica First NDC
(Archived)” hyperlink); The Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationally Determined
Contribution, UNFCCC 1, 7 (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Marshall Islands
Second NDC (Archived)” hyperlink); Singapore’s Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution (INDC) And Accompanying Information, UNFCCC 1 (Sep. 21, 2016),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Singapore First NDC
(Archived)” hyperlink); NDC of Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 97, at 7.
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Republic of Kiribati Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1, 3, 11
(Sep. 21, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Kiribati
First NDC” hyperlink); NDC of Tuvalu, supra note 98, at 5.
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Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 4.6, 9.4, 9.9, 11.1, 13.3.
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Id.; Christina Voigt, Felipe Ferreira, Differentiation in the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIM. L.
58, 62-64 (2016).
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developed nations. They have often claimed that the Paris Agreement does
not provide for bifurcation. 167 But this is unethical and not based on sound
legal principles as the Paris Agreement clearly incorporates the idea of
differentiation between developed and developing countries.168 The
requirement is to flush out the criteria and parameters for such a distinction.
In the end, the NDCs Guidance refers back to the exceptions carved out
under the Paris Agreement, such as flexibility for LDCs and SIDS under
article 4.6 and flexibility for developing countries under article 4.4.169 No
new categories of States with specific exceptions were created in the
Rulebook. Instead, language, such as “as appropriate,” “as applicable,” and
“in the light of national circumstances,” was inserted to signal the need for
flexibility, but without differentiating among State Parties.170
Economic development is one of the potential ways to categorize States
for the purpose of differentiation. However, to look at the entire framework
of differentiation from the lens of economic development would seriously
undermine the importance of other relevant considerations such as social
and cultural adaptation capabilities, and special vulnerability of countries
including small island States and LDCs due to a number of factors such as
sea-level rise and their peculiar geographical location, etc. Sands and Peel
recognize the need for a further level of differentiation in the international
climate change regime considering the current socio-economic and political
realities of States particularly while differentiating between developed
countries and major developing countries including China, India, Brazil
and South Africa.171 In other words, the advanced version of the CBDR
principle under the climate change regime inevitably requires its further
improvement by analyzing the nuances of economics, socio-cultural and
legal-political dimensions while focusing on women, youth, and local and
marginalized communities particularly vulnerable to the adverse effect of
climate change.
In this scenario, differentiation based on multiple parameters can be
developed. Parameters can include total emissions, relative emissions,
cumulative emissions, emissions per GDP, projected emissions,
luxury/survival emissions, total GDP, GDP per capita, human development
index (HDI), climate vulnerability, and mitigation potential, etc. Based on
167

Meena Raman, Key Challenges at COP 24, KATOWICE NEWS UPDATES AND CLIMATE
BRIEFINGS, THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1, 2 (Dec. 2018), https://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
fullpdf/katowice01.pdf.
168
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 3, 4.1, 4.4-5, 4.15, 5.2, 6.6, 7.2-3, 7.6-7, 7.13-14,
9.1, 9.3, 9.5-9, 10.5-6, 11.1-4, 13.2-3, 13.9-15.
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Decision 4/CMA.1, supra note 105, ¶ 4, annex I, ¶¶ 1(c) and 6, annex II, ¶ 1(b).
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Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1030, 1034.
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Sands & Peel et al., supra note 4, at 247-8.
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these indexes and parameters, countries can be divided into types I, II and
III, thus reflecting the true essence of CBDR-RC. Countries could be
categorized as developed, developing and least developed according to
their HDI ranking and vulnerability status. This could be re-evaluated and
revised every 10 years or at a time decided by the State Parties. The above
classification of countries into type I, II, and III categories would provide
the much-needed clarification to the developed and developing categories
of countries and their varied obligations as provided under the Paris
Agreement. It would also help adjudicate the adequacy and ambitious
nature of NDCs. This classification system would help streamline the scope
and subject matters of NDCs discussed in the next section. It would also
ease the task of evaluation by pertinent technical and scientific bodies (such
as Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice), manage
expectations of the international community, and assist the task of the
implementation and compliance branch of the Paris Agreement to examine,
evaluate, and follow-up on the collective progress under global stocktake.
Finally, categorizing countries on identifiable, objective criteria is essential
as placing countries individually would defeat the purpose of equity, which
is the cornerstone of the climate change legal framework.
E. Promoting Equity through Expanding the Scope of NDCs
Though the Paris Agreement requires countries to submit their NDCs,
what constitutes the content of the NDCs has been a matter of contention.
Developing nations insist on the principle of equity172 and CBDR-RC along
with emphasis on the full scope of NDCs, including mitigation, adaptation,
and means of implementation. Developed countries, however, view NDCs
as being mitigation-oriented only.173 The Rulebook provides that as far as
the contents and the information to be provided for the NDCs are
concerned, the information is without prejudice to the inclusion of
components other than mitigation.174 This is viewed by developing
countries as a major win on the scope of NDCs, which not only relates to
mitigation contributions but may include an adaptation component, along
172

Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference: 1–14 December 2014, 12 EARTH
NEGOT. BULL. 1, 28, 29 (2014).
173
See Pieter Pauw et al., Subtle Differentiation of Countries’ Responsibilities Under the
Paris Agreement, 5 (86) PALGRAVE COMMUN. 1, 5-6 (2019); W. Pieter Pauw et al., Beyond
Headline Mitigation Numbers: We Need More Transparent and Comparable NDCs to
Achieve the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 147 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 23, 26–27
(2018); EARTH NEGOT. BULL., supra note 172, at 27-28; Summary of the Katowice Climate
Change Conference: 2–15 December 2018, 12 EARTH NEGOT. BULL. 1, 13 (2018).
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Decision 4/CMA.1, supra note 105, ¶ 8; Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 102931.
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with the necessary means of implementation.175 This needs to be made
mandatory for consistency and certainty, otherwise, it may have the effect
of overlooking the holistic response needed to address multidimensional
aspects of climate change and diminishing the importance attached to
adaptation and other aspects of climate change. It is also necessary to
measure the progress of countries under the global stock-take process. It is
interesting to note that the Paris Agreement provides an opportunity for
States where they are allowed to submit their adaptation-related
information as part of their NDCs: States are free to submit their adaptation
communication as a component of or in conjunction with their national
adaptation plan or NDC or national communication.176 This provision can
be a valid justification for most of the countries that have made their
domestic adaptation plans part of their NDCs. More than that, this
provision can also form a valid entry point for developed nations providing
information related to adaptation actions taken domestically and support
provided internationally, thus promoting equity and fairness through the
implementation of their NDCs.
Furthermore, the language of article 3 of the Agreement also
emphasizes the fact that States’ NDCs are not limited to the issue of
mitigation only but cover other issues related to adaptation, finance,
technology, and transparency framework. Article 3 says that: “As
nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate
change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as
defined in articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13.” This article implies two
meanings. First, “nationally determined contributions” (i.e., NDCs) are
meant to be applied against the “global response [which is not limited to
only mitigation response] to climate change.”177 Because of the wider scope
of the term “global response to climate change,” the concept of NDC can
be construed in such manner so as to include in its content the issues of
adaptation and means of implementation. Second, as a result of this, States
are required under their NDCs to “undertake and communicate ambitious
efforts” regarding adaptation and international support. In sum, article 3 is
a valid legal justification for the countries and a requirement to include in
their NDCs the efforts which they have taken regarding adaptation and
175

Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1037-38.
Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 7.11.
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support pursuant to their obligations under the relevant provisions of the
Agreement.
It is also important to point out that expanding the scope of NDCs
would not require major overhauling of the Paris Agreement, but is in
consonance with the spirit and objective of the Paris Agreement as the
Agreement makes explicit references to human rights, sustainable
development, and contents of SDGs. The implementation of these goals
would require providing for information and taking into consideration
economic and social development, gender issues, indigenous and local
communities, and international cooperation, among other things. This
aspect can only be taken care of when we expand the scope of NDCs
beyond mitigation to cover adaptation, loss-and-damage, and international
support, etc.178 This point would also be in consonance with the fact that
climate change is not only an environmental challenge, but also one of the
biggest developmental threats in terms of varied economic consequences of
climate change,179 and thus requires a holistic response.180
In addition to mitigation, the expansion of NDCs’ contents to include
other aspects is ingrained in the equity and the north-south difference.
Developing nations who have not contributed historically to climate change
are the biggest victims of climate change and therefore, they need to adapt
to climate change immediately. Therefore, adaptation has emerged for
developing nations as a major concern required to be addressed at all
levels, from the local to national to regional. Effective adaptation would
require a comprehensive strategy taking into account economic and social
considerations. This would also be in consonance with, and can be used to
enhance, the Paris Agreement’s adaptation goal of “establishing the global
goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience
and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to
sustainable development.”181
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the direct and indirect economic consequences of climate change in a selected economic
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Further expanding the scope of NDCs to adaptation with a provision
for financial assistance, technology transfer and other areas would require
considerable attention to economic and social development components
and would ultimately help the wider interpretation of CBDR-RC to nonenvironmental contexts. When the CBDR principle is applied to the
environmental context and environmental-related global goals (such as
climate change mitigation), the underlying idea for differentiation lies in
the heart of historic responsibility; in case of non-environmental related
global goals (such as social and economic development), the core idea for
differentiation thrives at the center of different national “capacities and
priorities” which each State carries. The application of the CBDR principle
to non-environmental related global goals, however, is dependent upon the
varying degree of national “capacity” of each State, such capacity,
especially in terms of financial accumulation and technology advancement,
has been built up (in the case of developed countries) and adversely
affected (in the case of developing countries) as a result of historical
reasons. In this way, the CBDR principle should be applied even to those
cases where historical responsibility has not been mentioned as one of the
reasons for differentiation (especially in matters of economic and social
development) since the different degrees of each State’s capacity is [may
necessarily be] an inevitable result of those historical actions.
The differentiation in NDCs could be further extended to the case of
compliance mechanisms whereby countries could be asked to provide
information about implementation status.182 Article 15 of the Paris
Agreement envisages the establishment of a committee that shall be expertbased and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent,
non-adversarial and non-punitive.183 The committee shall pay particular
attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of
Parties. Modalities and procedures developed for the Compliance
Committee specifically state that its work has to “be guided by the
provisions of the Paris Agreement, including . . . article 2,” which refers to
182
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sustainable development and equity as operational principles.184 In
addition, “[t]he Committee shall pay particular attention to the respective
national capabilities and circumstances of Parties, recognizing the special
circumstances of the [LDCs] and [SIDS], at all stages of the process, in
accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement, including in
determining how to consult with the Party concerned, what assistance can
be provided to the Party concerned to support its engagement with the
Committee, and what measures are appropriate to facilitate implementation
and promote compliance in each situation.”185 Further it is provided that the
financial “assistance should be provided, upon request, to developing
country Parties . . . to enable their necessary participation in the relevant
meetings of the Committee.”186 This explicit reference to, and treatment of,
differentiation provides a scope for bringing differentiation to compliance
mechanisms and also points to the need to identify and resolve the
categorization of differentiation between “developed” and “developing”
countries. Based on the above analysis, it is suggested that developed
countries are expected to integrate into their NDCs obligations of providing
transparent and consistent information on support, and to expand the scope
of their NDCs incorporating adaptation plans and providing information
and explanation on how their NDCs are fair and ambitious in the context of
sustainable development. This paper has argued for the division of NDCs
by building on the differentiation provided under the Paris Agreement. This
would provide nuanced categorization and offer clarity on who is to
provide support and who should be the beneficiaries. Such clarity at
normative level becomes important where article 4.5 of the Agreement is
silent on it. For UNFCCC Parties to practically avail the benefits of equity
and provisions of the Paris Agreement on support, the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)
needs to adopt a decision providing more clarity about the categorization of
countries into different categories based on the indicators broadly
highlighted above. The basis for such categorization and differentiation is
already provided for under several provisions of the Agreement. The
problem would nevertheless be regarding how to further develop those
indicators to be adaptive to the national circumstances of each country.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of SDGs, with their complementary nature and integrated
relationship of environment and development, contributes to achieving the
184
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climate goals of adaptation and mitigation. The climate change regime, on
the other hand, provides a legal basis and normative tools for States’ efforts
towards realizing the fruits of sustainability. In this complementary
process, equity plays an important role as a driving force to implementing
States’ NDCs in light of their national circumstances. Equity under the
climate change regime is channeled through the application of the principle
of CBDR-RC, which is a living principle and still evolving.187 States’
submission of NDCs suggest that the NDCs can provide opportunity for
achieving not only the Paris Agreement temperature goal of 2 degrees
Celsius, but overall long-term goals of building a resilient society with the
idea of “leaving no one behind” focusing on youth, women, and vulnerable
sections of society. Thus, the evolutionary principle of CBDR-RC, needs to
be reframed and widely interpreted in the overall context of sustainable
development. While the adoption of SDGs with the idea of “leaving no one
behind” provides a solid foundation with political legitimacy, the
incorporation of CBDR in the SDG outcome document opens up the
possibility of incorporating and applying CBDR to all dimensions of
sustainable development. The wider interpretation of the CBDR-RC
principle, therefore, must be extended and applied in the implementation of
NDCs. This would also be in consonance with many NDCs revealing the
significance attached to sustainable development and SDGs.
The Paris Agreement encompasses several legal provisions, and thus
provides a way for this wider interpretation to become applicable to all
aspects of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.
Following the Paris Agreement, equity could be promoted under the
climate change regime through implementation of NDCs, while expanding
the scope of NDCs explicitly covering mitigation and adaptation targets
with detailed information. Equity could also be promoted through fairness
requirements of NDCs. This aspect of equity would, however, face legal
challenges in defining the parameters of fairness. Further, there is an urgent
need for classification of countries into different categories based on
multiple factors including climate vulnerability, gender considerations, and
differing levels of economic and human development and corresponding
capacity of States. This explicit reference and treatment for differentiation
provides the scope for bringing differentiations to compliance mechanisms
and also points to the need to identify and resolve the categorization of
differentiation between “developed” and “developing” countries and their
varied obligations as provided under the Paris Agreement. Differentiation
will help to adjudicate the adequacy and ambitious nature of the NDCs.
187
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Conditional NDCs if provided international support could further enhance
equity at the next level. However, it is important to balance the equity
considerations with those of efficacy requirements: too much emphasis on
conditional NDCs could affect the efficiency of NDC implementation.
Thus, conditional NDCs remain both an opportunity and a potential
vulnerability for ambition and equity. To this end, to promote equity and
justify fairness through the transparency framework provided under the
Paris Agreement, developed countries are, nevertheless, expected to come
out with NDCs incorporating detailed quantified information regarding
international support provided to developing countries, LDCs, and SIDS.
They are also expected to provide detailed explanations of how their NDCs
are “fair and ambitious,” and to ensure that their NDCs will be
implemented in the context of sustainable development. The lack of
information regarding international support in the NDCs of developed
countries may raise the question of how successive NDCs of developing
countries with higher ambitions will be ﬁnanced. In this regard, developing
countries are also expected to come out with detailed NDCs, adding
substance to their international support needs with information regarding
calculated and credible cost estimates. Thus, developing and developed
countries are expected to provide all this information regarding
international support received and delivered, respectively, in terms of
providing financial assistance and technology transfer and investing in
capacity-building measures of developing countries. Because climate
change negotiations and issues of equity are an ongoing process, CMA
should start giving deference to new equity considerations and adopt
guidance on how NDCs can be implemented with focus on a holistic
interpretation of, and an integrated approach to, the principle of CBDR-RC.
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